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Abstract
Using daily data from 2002-2020, this study tests for contagion in the Eurozone using a binary
stress indicator for extreme occurrences of sovereign bond yields. Contagion is evaluated by
the significance of a country’s stress indicator in explaining other countries’ stress periods,
controlling for push and pull factors in order to disentangle contagion from interdependence, and
following Sala-i-Martin (1997) to obtain robust results. We find evidence of contagion, albeit
diverging from the well-documented Eurozone core-periphery dichotomy, with relationships nor
mutual nor exclusive. We find that Greece’s impact is not as widespread as expected, while
Italy’s gains traction across crises, alluding to “wake-up call” contagion.
Keywords: Financial Crises, Contagion, Financial Stress, Sovereign Bond Markets, Euro-Area.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank both Professor Miguel Lebre de Freitas and Professor Luís Catela-Nunes
for their patience and permanent support throughout the entire project. To Carolina, Andrey, and
all that offered me their valuable input, I extend my gratitude. I dedicate this to my parents.
This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209),
POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209)
and POR Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209).
1
1 Introduction
When, in late 2009, news hit that Greece had been underreporting its budget deficit, hardly
anyone could predict the severe tensions that would emerge in global financial markets. By
December 2009, all three main rating agencies (Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s) had
downgraded Greek debt, raising the yields on its sovereign bonds and effectively shutting it out
of financial markets. As perceptions of insolvency persisted even after EU/IMF rescue packages,
countries with perceived weak macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals such as Portugal, Spain,
Italy and Ireland saw their credit ratings successively downgraded and suffered mass sell-offs of
their sovereign bonds, stressing the sovereign-bond markets and causing a tacit re-emergence
of significant spreads against the German Bund after almost a decade of a certain apparent
desensitization of markets to these countries’ fiscal resources. Over a decade later, a full recovery
had not been achieved and market sentiment was still often biased against these countries.
It is unarguable that the sovereign debt crisis exposed a number of architectural flaws in
the EMU’s structure such as the lack of a common lender of last resort policy, the large
interdependency of financial and banking systems or its apparent inability to manage common
shocks, especially those asynchronous (Shambaugh, 2012). Additionally, it has resuscitated the
interest on financial contagion, making it one of the epicenters of Euro-related concerns and
reigniting a movement for literature on this topic. The rash and simultaneous rise in borrowing
costs across the EMU’s periphery following the onset of Greek instability has become a prolific
subject of academic discussion where notable works such as De Santis (2012) and Mink and de
Haan (2013) present convincing evidence on the existence of contagion in financial markets by
studying the volatility of sovereign yields or credit default swaps within the Euro area.
This paper aims to contribute to existing literature by testing the bilateral contagious links
between 12 EMU countries under periods of financial stress. In the absence of a consensual
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definition of financial stress, episodes of tension are not specified a priori through other sources
that date crises episodes. Rather, using daily data from 2002 to 2020, a binary indicator variable
for financial stress in each country’s sovereign bond market is constructed following Calvo et
al. (2004)’s methodology for the identification of extreme periods. The presence of bilateral
contagion is thus assessed by the statistical significance of a given country’s stress indicator
in being able to explain the stress felt in other countries, controlling for both common (push
factors, such as external financing conditions) and country-specific determinants (pull factors,
representative of economic fundamentals), in an attempt to distinguish what constitutes contagion
from interdependence. The high correlation between sovereign yields within the EMU raises
identification concerns, and as such, variables representative of other countries’ stress cannot be
appended all at once. Instead, following Sala-i-Martin (1997), they are included in combinations
of three, leading this paper to run thousands of regressions to obtain collinearity-robust results. By
working outside the scope of correlation analysis, this study offers its contribution by presenting
a careful analysis on the direction of contagion as opposed to just testing for its presence, thus
distinguishing between the “contagious” country and the country that feels its penalties.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing body of literature.
Section 3 introduces the model specification for identifying financial stress and contagion, while
Section 4 clarifies the data used. Section 5 presents empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Literature on financial contagion is extensive, yet not unanimous. There is a startling amount
of disagreement among economists on how to best define contagion, and consequently, how to
identify it and measure it empirically (Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014). In broad terms,
the concept often refers to excess spillovers of financial turmoil from one market to another,
beyond what can be explained by market fundamentals (see inter alia, Eichengreen et al., 1996,
Bekaert et al., 2005 and Constâncio, 2012). Karolyi and Stulz (1996), for instance, state that
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“contagion effects result when enthusiasm for stocks in one market brings about enthusiasm
for stocks in other markets, regardless of the evolution of market fundamentals”. Kaminsky et
al. (2003) suggest it is a chain reaction response of other countries to certain financial events.
This is also denoted as herding behaviour or “pure" contagion, that is, contagion arising from
self-fulfilling panic and loss of confidence among investors because periods of market uncertainty
rely on more than the changes in risk-pricing of fundamentals (Ludwig, 2014), leading to the
alarming possibility that some markets are being punished for crises they had little to do with.
A growing number of authors have offered their contribution to a potential definition. As a
result of recent events, the relative importance of the role of fundamentals as a channel through
which shocks are transmitted has come into light. This was highlighted during the sovereign
debt crisis and gave rise to another strand of the literature on contagion, one that takes place
through fundamental links rather than beyond them, the so called “wake-up call” or fundamentals
contagion, coined by Goldstein (1998) and presented in Goldstein et al. (2000) and Bekaert
et al. (2014). It argues that a crisis in a given country may be responsible for providing new
information that leads financial markets to reassess their perceptions about countries with similar
characteristics, changing the way fundamentals are priced and spreading the crisis across borders.
Most definitions, however, hinge on a number of difficulties in terms of interpretation. A
common factor that drives up volatility in several markets is likely to increase the magnitude of
co-movements between these countries as a result of interdependence and not contagion per se.
In a pivotal work, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) address this issue. They outline contagion as "a
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country" and present a test to
compare cross-country correlations between tranquil and turbulent periods, claiming that only a
substantial shift in volatility-adjusted co-movements may be identified as contagion, in order to
exclude the possibility of capturing solely interdependence. Nevertheless, Corsetti et al. (2002)
point that there is no single interpretation of interdependence, and as such, no claim of contagion
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can be considered unequivocal. There also remains a lot of discussion on what constitutes a
global shock and which should qualify as contagion. The chain reaction following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers is often regarded as contagion, even if this was a global shock resulting from
existing fundamental links between countries’ banking systems (Buchholz and Tonzer, 2013).
On the grounds of inherent identification problems, this diversity of definitions is also reflected
through a panoply of different methodologies developed across time. Naturally, some of these
have gained more traction than others, and thus offered more prolific contributions, as is the
case of correlation analysis. In a pioneering work, King and Wadhwani (1990) search for a
higher correlation between the U.S., U.K. and Japan during the 1987 crash in world stock
markets. Eichengreen et al. (1996), however, offer their input through probability analysis. By
constructing a binary indicator for exchange rate market pressure and estimating a probit model
using macroeconomic fundamentals as explanatory variables, they were able to prove that a
currency crisis in a given country raised the likelihood of a speculative attack in others.
While there are some notable exceptions (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1996), a sizable proportion
of the literature studies the presence of contagion using sovereign bond yields and/or credit
default swaps, especially so after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. Such is the case of
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), who use counterfactual analysis to prove there would have been
less convergence in sovereign yields between EMU countries in the pre-crisis period if financial
markets had priced fundamentals in 1999-2007 the same way they did in 2008-2011. Manasse
and Zavalloni (2013) find that about 54 to 80% of the change in CDS spreads was explained by
market fundamentals. Similarly, Favero and Missale (2012) and Bai et al. (2012) find evidence
that yields are mostly driven by fiscal fundamentals in periods of risk aversion. Missio and
Watzka (2011) and Mink and de Haan (2013) find that select news reports about Greece’s public
finances, credit rating announcements and the willingness of other countries to provide financial
support contribute to abnormal returns not only on international banks’ stock prices, but also on
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the yields of countries like Portugal, Spain and Ireland. Analogously, Arghyrou and Kontonikas
(2012) and Afonso et al. (2012) find evidence of contagion from the deterioration of Greek
fundamentals to the vast majority of the Euro area. Further papers can be cited as pervasive
evidence for “wake-up call” contagion, showing that there was a period of benign neglect of
fiscal fundamentals in the years preceding the crisis (see, inter alia, Aizenman et al., 2013).
While the existing body of work on contagion in the Eurozone bond market is comprehensive,
the present study aims to offer its contribution by applying Sala-i-Martin (1997)’s approach for
the identification of robust determinants in order to identify and describe countries’ bilateral
contagious links occurring under periods of financial stress. By emphasizing the direction of
contagion and assessing it on both ends, it is possible to obtain a clearer understanding of how
contagion is actually channelled and what countries are affected as a result. Moreover, by a
priori controlling for push factors, this paper is able to disentangle, to some extent, what can be
qualified as contagion and not interdependence, a common problem in the literature.
3 Methodology
3.1 Constructing a Financial Stress Indicator
Identifying contagion in the Euro area requires the definition of periods of financial stress.
Sovereign bond yield differentials against Germany are often used to reflect the default risk of
a given country, as they represent the premia required by investors to accept sovereign debt in
comparison to a German Bund of equal maturity. However, yields on sovereign bonds within the
EMU are extremely correlated amongst each other (Panel A on Table A.1 of the Appendix). A
high correlation between explanatory variables could lead to unstable parameter estimates with
inflated variances and standard errors, which undermines the ability to identify their importance in
the model (Stevens, 2002). Moreover, following abundant empirical research, linear econometric
models such as simple linear regressions may not be sufficiently informative when it comes to
the extreme occurrences of sovereign yields. Drawing inference can lead to conflicting results as
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financial stress occurs only seldom but still has a substantial disruptive impact (Grimaldi, 2010).
To overcome these problems, our estimation exercise is based on the construction of an
indicator that signals times of financial tension in sovereign debt markets. Following Calvo et al.
(2004), an episode of financial stress is identified with the following criteria: (i) it must contain
at least one observation (one day) where the differential between the sovereign’s yield vis-à-vis
Germany lies at least two standard deviations above a rolling mean calculated over the previous
60 days and (ii) the episode starts once the differential surpasses the historical mean by one
standard deviation and it ends once it reverts back to the mean, crossing below the one standard
deviation mark once again. This creates a binary variable that takes value one if the country is
experiencing a period of stress and zero otherwise. This is the model’s dependent variable.
One must acknowledge this indicator’s limitations. By using yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany,
a stress episode as here defined is capturing impacts from both the country under analysis and
Germany. A rise in Portuguese yield constitutes a period of stress in Portugal, as does a decrease
in German yield, ceteris paribus. Additionally, periods of optimism in market sentiment often
result in a sell-off of sovereign bonds, as investors prefer riskier assets that offer more return.
3.2 Identifying the Determinants of Financial Stress: Panel Analysis
Before turning to the assessment of contagious links, a panel data approach is employed for
the identification of the other drivers of financial stress. The concept of contagion commonly
relates to the propagation of shocks between countries beyond what economic fundamentals are
expected to explain, as previously stated. Therefore, underlying this definition is the need to
accurately account for fundamentals. For that reason, a dynamic panel specification is adopted
to account for country-specific effects and to mitigate any potential auto-correlation stemming
from the persistence of sovereign yields. The following probit regression is analyzed:








tη + εi,t ] (3.1)
εi,t = αi +ui,t
where subindexes i and t refer to country and time. yi,t corresponds to the previously stipulated
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financial stress indicator, whereas yi,t−1 refers to the lagged dependent variable, whose coefficient
allows for the study of positive state dependence of financial distress (Heckman, 1981), that is,
whether or not previous periods of financial stress affect countries in a persistent manner.
Regressors were chosen to assess the response of financial distress to both common
determinants (push factors, represented in vector Pt) and determinants specific to the countries
themselves (pull factors, through vector Xi,t), drawing on existing literature (see, inter alia
Bernoth and Erdogan, 2010 and Comelli, 2012) even if it is the case that economists still debate
on the appropriate set of variables to control for. This study includes additionally vector Dt ,
corresponding to a compilation of events that we a priori believe to be relevant in influencing the
financial distress of Euro area members either positively or negatively during the period under
analysis. Moreover, cluster-robust standard errors are used to control for serial correlation in εi,t .
The idiosyncratic error term ui,t is assumed to be independent across both i and t.
The use of panel data requires assumptions to be made on unobserved effects αi. Since
country-specific effects are unlikely to be orthogonal to explanatory variables, a fixed-effects
model should be used. However, fixed-effects on non-linear models such as probit generally
suffer from the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948), where estimates of β
are inconsistent because there is only a fixed number of observations to estimate each unobserved
effect αi, leading this inconsistency to be propagated to all coefficients and their respective
marginal effects due to the non-linearity of the model (Cruz-Gonzalez et al., 2017). For this
purpose, this paper follows most of the literature assuming a random-effects specification as
opposed to fixed-effects, given the importance of estimating marginal effects.
The choice of a random-effects approach to avoid the incidental parameters problem does not
permit the mitigation of the another problem: the initial conditions problem, where the initial
period yi,0 is likely to be correlated to εi,t , which will in turn affect yi,t . If this is ignored and yi,0
is treated as exogenous, then inconsistent estimates will be obtained: if financial stress in day 1
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is associated with financial stress occurring at day 0 because of both unobserved heterogeneity
and state dependence, without correcting for the underlying bias, the coefficient on yi,t −1 will
be overestimated and the coefficients on the remaining regressors will likely be underestimated.
Arguably, the fact that this panel holds a very substantial T (4,806 time periods) poses a strong
argument on the insignificance of both issues and using a simple dynamic probit with random-
effects is likely to report similar results. Notwithstanding, a robustness check is performed by
including a model correcting for this bias with the Wooldridge estimator (Wooldridge, 2005)
to account for initial conditions in non-linear, dynamic probit models and thus verify whether
reported coefficients differ substantially from those obtained originally.
3.3 Identifying Financial Contagion: Time Series Analysis
After identifying the baseline economic fundamentals, this paper tests for the presence of
contagion across EMU countries in times of distress using a time series framework.
First, one should note that the use of a probit model implies that results on contagion should
be interpreted as a statistically significant increase in the probability of financial distress of a
given country conditional on another becoming distressed, in line with a sizable portion of the
literature that evaluates contagion as the shift in co-movements occurring in extreme periods.
Having already corrected for the issue of collinearity amongst regressors by creating a binary
stress indicator, the problem becomes another, stemming instead from the fact that a lot of the
tranquil periods (stress=0) overlap. This means that the simple inclusion of all financial stress
variables in the baseline regression simultaneously would lead to biased and inconsistent results
(reported with a sign which is contrary to theory and previous research). In order to avoid this
issue, this paper relies on the methodology proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997) where the stress
indicators of three other countries ( j, l and m) are added to the initial regression in combinations
of 3 out of the remaining 11 EMU countries for which data was collected. In total, each country
i=1,. . . ,N will require 165 probit regressions (C113 ) plus 165 other regressions for the computation
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of the marginal effects. That being said, variables y j,t , yl ,t and ym,t correspond to indicators that
take value one whenever country j, l and m are experiencing financial stress, respectively.









t η + y j,t
′
θ j,t + yl ,t ′ θl ,t + ym,t ′ θm,t + εi,t ]
(3.2)
Sala-i-Martin developed this model to robustly define the determinants of economic growth
after finding existing tests too restrictive. In a set of 58 possible explanatory variables, Sala-i-
Martin randomly draws regressors in sets of three, running millions of regressions, weighing
each one by its integrated likelihood and then studying the response of the dependent variable.
By using this methodology in this study, contagion is evaluated as the significance of a given
country’s stress indicator in justifying the stress of remaining countries, when controlling for push
and pull factors in order to be able to disentangle contagion from interdependence. Furthermore,
it is possible to report (i) the average impact of country j’s financial stress on country i, weighted
by the integrated likelihood of each regression in which it was included and (ii) the fraction of
these in which it was statistically significant. This ensures robustness of results obtained.
The inclusion of other countries’ financial stress indicators as regressors in the model to
identify contagion is not free of criticism. In fact, one country’s financial stress is likely to
influence another’s, exacerbating its own and leading to a case of endogeneity via reverse
causality. There’s a certain circularity in stress which is somewhat self-explanatory within the
context of a monetary union because yields are tightly linked. In order to mitigate this problem,
this paper lags the financial stress of other countries by one day, as markets adjust fairly quickly.
4 Data1
4.1 Countries’ Stress Indicators
For the construction of countries’ stress indicators, data was collected regarding the 10-year
sovereign bond yields2 of 12 EMU countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Ireland, Belgium,
1All data was obtained from Bloomberg.
2Sovereign bond yields were chosen over CDS spreads because existing literature has since proven that there
have been policy actions that have significantly affected the first but not the latter (Bilal and Singh, 2012), and
therefore to focus on CDS spreads could mean forgoing potentially relevant periods of financial distress.
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Austria, Netherlands, Greece, Finland, Slovakia and Slovenia), and analyzed as a differential
vis-à-vis Germany. During the crisis, the yield on the German Bund hit record lows while other
countries’ soared, proving its status as a proxy for a risk-free rate in what concerns debt markets.
The frequency of this data is daily and covers the period from 1 Jan 2002 to 31 Aug 2020.3 High
frequency data was chosen to account for persistent effects of sovereign yields (De Santis, 2012).
One should note that Slovakia and Slovenia did not join the Euro at the same time as other
member-states here included (Slovenia joined in Jan 2007 whereas Slovakia joined in Jan 2009).
As mentioned by Ódor and Povala (2016), the analysis of credit risk premium of these countries
in the period prior to their entry in the EMU is complicated, because even with the application
of the ERM2 band for two consecutive years, yields are distorted by exchange rate fluctuations
of the Slovak koruna and Slovenian tolar against the euro. This could pose a limitation to the
analysis of the full sample period, as these countries are likely to present an exaggerated number
of financial stress episodes. To mitigate this problem, contagious links will only be assessed
from 2008 onward, considering the results of Ehrmann et al. (2011) who argue that convergence
of sovereign yields seems to be achieved not by the adoption of the common currency itself, but
rather by its anticipation. Likewise, Hüfner and Koske (2008) showed that by 2008, the spread
between Slovak and German yields was already comparable to that of other EMU countries.
4.2 Economic Fundamentals
The choice on the set of explanatory variables for the identification of economic fundamentals
was conditional on the availability of data. As many other studies that use high-frequency data
(e.g. Favero et al., 2010), it is not possible to use variables that grasp macroeconomic and
fiscal fundamentals, only available at lower frequencies. Nonetheless, regressors chosen aim to
reflect aggregate risk, global liquidity and stress in the interbank market (push factors) as well
3Exceptions are Slovakia and Slovenia, both due to data unavailability. The former only has data starting on 19
Jun 2002 and has a gap corresponding to the period between 1 Dec 2006 and 31 May 2007. The latter’s data only
starts on 4 Apr 2007. Furthermore, data for Luxembourg was not collected because it did not have a debt security
with a maturity of ten years until mid-May 2010.
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country-specific risk, following extensive literature on the determinants of sovereign yields (e.g.
Afonso et al., 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2010).
In what concerns push factors, vector Pt includes: (i) the Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market Volatility Index (VIX), often known as Wall Street’s “fear gauge”, in order to reflect
the implied volatility of international financial risk perceptions of global markets, thus proxying
for market risk aversion; (ii) Interbank Tensions, through the spread between the three-month
Euribor and the three-month overnight index swap (OIS) rates, well-cited to be a barometer of
distress in the banking system (Ðukić and Ðukić, 2011); (iii) the U.S. 10-Year Treasury Note
Yield, historically perceived as riskless and benefiting from a certain safe-haven status, included
as a measure of global liquidity and to assess the existence of flight-to-safety (where stress in
one country induces the opposite reaction in U.S. yield); (iv) the EUR-USD Exchange Rate,
to reflect fundamentals in the Euro area, as an increase in its value entails a weakness of the
currency (depreciation), consistent with a higher variation in yields and thus, financial stress.
Vector Xi,t (pull factors) includes: (i) the launch of the Excessive Deficit Procedure for
countries’ lack of compliance with EMU’s thresholds; and (ii) Sovereign Credit Rating,
measured by the average credit rating attributed by the three main Rating Agencies (Moody’s,
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s) after being codified the into a linear numerical scale as in Afonso
et al. (2012)’s empirical research (Table A.3 on the Appendix). Its inclusion follows several
authors who document significant responses of yields to changes in credit ratings, indicating that
these are able to spur financial instability (e.g. Arezki et al., 2011 and De Santis, 2012).
Before proceeding to estimation results, it is necessary to address some concerns that question
the validity of the model, namely, the presence of endogeneity. One can expect that a given
country’s credit rating changes as a response to financial stress the same way one expects the
yield spread to widen as a response to a rating downgrade. The fact that sovereign rating can
implicate and be implicated by financial stress, originates a negative bias. However, using daily
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data provides a way to mitigate contemporaneous endogeneity as it is unlikely that ratings change
at the same time as yields and vice-versa. In fact, it can even be argued that, as rating agencies
often aim to promote stability, they only change a given rating when they are certain that any
change in the country’s risk profile is likely to be permanent, leading credit ratings to lag yield
spreads and this paper to conclude that the presence of endogeneity is unlikely. In a pivotal
work, Hull et al. (2012) find evidence that yield spreads often anticipate credit rating reviews,
in particular for downgrades. This seems to suggest not only the relative importance of rating
downgrades over upgrades but also the need to lag this regressor by one day in order to better
reflect direct causality. For this reason, instead of average rating, a lagged indicator variable for
credit rating downgrades is included. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, an additional model
is computed where the lagged downgrade is instrumented by a three-day lag, following Hull et
al. (2012)’s findings that spreads adjust fully to the information in the rating change by day +1.
While this might not offer the best possible instrumentation, it does allow for the computation of
a Wald test to assess this paper’s hypothesis of exogeneity.
It is also necessary to assess the possibility of non-stationarity of the model’s regressors. For
this purpose, unit-root tests are conducted on each variable. The vast majority of those included
are integrated of order zero and thus pose no problem (see Table A.4 on the Appendix). However,
interbank tensions and U.S. yield are integrated of order one, so, in order to correct for this issue,
the change in these variables is used instead of the variables in levels, such that:
∆ITi,t = ITi,t− ITi,t−1
∆USi,t =USi,t−USi,t−1
Finally, vector Dt represents a set of 8 dummy variables corresponding to specific events
that may have influenced country stress. It includes: (i) the news, on 21 Oct 2009 that the
Greek deficit for the year of 2008 surpassed 12% of GDP; (ii) the lowering of ECB’s quality
requirements for eligibility of debt to be used as a collateral from an A- to a BBB- rating
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on 25 Mar 2010; (iii) the announcements of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
and that, within the Security Markets Programme (SMP) the ECB and other central banks
of the Euro area would start purchasing securities, on 10 May 2010; (iv) the announcement
of two Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on 8 Dec 2011; (v) Mario Draghi’s
declaration that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the Euro, on 26 Jul 2012; (vi) the
announcement of the Quantitative Easing Programme on 22 Jan 2015; (vii) the announcement
(or the lack of thereof) of measures to help counter the COVID-19 crisis, on 12 Mar 2020, a day
of great expectation that the ECB would cut its benchmark rate (incidentally coinciding as well
with the announcement by President Trump that the U.S. would suspend the entry of Europeans
in American territory because of the vast increase in the number of infections); and finally
(viii) the announcement on 18 Mar 2020 of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
(PEPP), where C750 Billion would be provided to help counter the COVID-19 crisis.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Periods of Financial Stress
Table 5.1: Episodes of Financial Stress4,5
Country Ep. Pctg. Country Ep. Pctg. Country Ep. Pctg.
Austria 57 17.9% Greece 80 19.7% Portugal 69 19.5%
Belgium 56 19.5% Ireland 60 18.8% Slovakia 137 23.4%
Finland 51 17.3% Italy 55 17.3% Slovenia 88 19.2%
France 71 20.4% Netherlands 55 17.6% Spain 61 18.3%
Table 5.1 summarizes the number of episodes of financial stress and the corresponding
percentage of time out of the full period that was spent under stress for all sampled countries
(Panel B of Table A.1 on the Appendix offers additional statistics). Surprisingly, the fraction of
time spent under stress is somewhat homogeneous across countries, contradicting the common
notion that periphery countries are more volatile and thus more prone to financial stress. In fact,
similar values are found between Finland and Italy or Greece, Belgium and France, for instance.6
4Unless stated otherwise, all tables and figures in this paper are based on own calculations.
5As previously explained, the considerable number of stress episodes presented by Slovakia and Slovenia may
be related with these countries’ late entry into the common currency.
6In line with these results, Basse (2013) finds that bond markets seemingly have stopped accepting France as
belonging to the EMU’s core group.
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Figure 5.1: Financial Stress in Portugal 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in Portugal (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Portugal
Taking Portugal as an example for further analysis, 69 stress episodes were found (totaling 939
days), of which 10 (corresponding to 230 days) occur during the sovereign debt crisis. Panels a
and b of Figure 5.1 present a graphical representation of these periods for the case of Portugal.7
A qualitative assessment of the Portuguese stress indicator was performed using historical
news records from Financial Times, Reuters and Jornal de Negócios.8 Despite the existence of
a certain degree of subjectivity associated to media sources, by complementing an empirical
analysis with a narrative approach, this study is able to counter some of the ambiguity surrounding
these events. Particularly, panel b highlights that this stress indicator seems to fit well with the
narrative of key facts and episodes occurring in the Portuguese economy. For instance, it is
possible to infer that the shaded area referring to Jun - Jul 2005 concerns Standard & Poor’s
downgrade of Portugal’s credit rating to AA –. The two largest areas refer to several shocks under
the subprime crisis (Jun 2007 - Feb 2009) and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (Oct 2009 -
Feb 2012), respectively. Mid 2014, yields reached the year’s high due to the rescue of Banco
Espírito Santo, and again at the end of 2015 on fears that the new anti-austerity government
7Those of other countries are included in the Appendix, Figures A.1 to A.12.
8Table A.2 on the Appendix presents a detailed study of the 69 stress episodes found for Portugal.
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would be unstable policy-wise. Fears in 2016 refer to the aftermath of the Brexit referendum
and in May - Oct 2018 as a response to the uncertainty in Italian politics after a hung parliament.
Finally, the spike in Mar 2020 refers to the lockdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
This analysis suggests that Portugal is vulnerable to the international environment, as yields
surge in response to pressures on its creditworthiness from rating agencies and unrelated
crises in countries like the U.K. or Italy. These results seem to reinforce the idea of a certain
interdependence between EMU countries, which is to be expected in a monetary union, but also
that a large number of distress periods occurring after the end of the sovereign debt crisis arise in
tandem of other countries’ political crises. This suggests evidence on “wake-up call” contagion
in the Eurozone, as this crisis may have functioned as the “unfavorable signal” trigger that made
markets reassess their views on certain countries, which further motivates this research.
5.2 Assessing Economic Fundamentals: Panel Analysis
Table 5.2 reports the estimates on the initial regression for the identification of economic
fundamentals. Columns 1 to 3 present the results using a simple dynamic probit with random-
effects approach (Column 1), a dynamic probit with random-effects correcting for the initial
conditions problem (Column 2) and a dynamic probit using a two-stage-least-squares IV approach
in order to account for potential endogeneity stemming from lagged downgrade, where a 3-
day lag is used as instrument (Column 3). The first two columns show very similar results,
sustaining the hypothesis that the time-span covered by the model is sufficiently large to avoid the
typical limited dependent variable model problems. As expected, the result on the Wald test of
exogeneity does not suggest that lagged downgrade is endogenous. Therefore, this paper focuses
solely on the first model (marginal effects - column 4 - are only computed for this model).
Baseline results point to periods of financial stress being seemingly sensitive to the common
culprits studied in the literature. Global risk aversion (VIX) and interbank tensions (∆ ITi,t)
increase the probability of financial stress. The negative sign on the coefficient for U.S. yield
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seems to imply some evidence on flight-to-safety to the U.S. in times of crisis. These are results
consistent with previous studies on determinants of sovereign bond spreads (Afonso et al., 2012).
We find that the probability of stress after the implementation of LTROs or PEPP is lower by 1.2
and 27.9 percentage points, respectively, when compared to the absence of measures, ceteris
paribus. This contrasts with the 1.7 and 23.6 percentage point increase in the probability of
stress after the Greek deficit reveal and the events of Mar 12, respectively.
Table 5.2: Determinants of Financial Stress (Panel Analysis)
Simple Bias-Corrected IV Marginal Effects
Stress Stress Stress Stress
Lagged Stress 3.516∗∗∗ 3.516∗∗∗ 3.553∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.0787) (0.0787) (0.0427) (0.009)
Xi,t
EDP 0.0432 0.0424 0.065∗ 0.003
(0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0367) (0.009)
Lagged Downgrade −0.0277 −0.0249 −11.054 −0.002
(0.154) (0.154) (10.269) (0.002)
Dt
Greek De f icit Reveal 0.282∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.0925) (0.0922) (0.0891) (0.005)
A+ to BBB− −0.311∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.0790) (0.0788) (0.0793) (0.004)
SMP 0.0401 0.0401 0.0479 0.002
(0.0582) (0.0581) (0.0724) (0.004)
LT ROS −0.205∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.120 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.0789) (0.0799) (0.1071) (0.004)
”Whatever It Takes” −0.110 −0.108 −0.246∗ −0.007
(0.124) (0.123) (0.149) (0.007)
QE 0.178∗ 0.176∗ 0.249∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.0913) (0.0914) (0.113) (0.005)
March 12th 3.957∗∗∗ 3.992∗∗∗ 3.576 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0913) (0.0914) (147.99) (0.018)
PEPP −4.679∗∗∗ −4.715∗∗∗ −4.279 −0.279∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.139) (147.99) (0.016)
Pt
V IX 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00169) (0.0001)
EUR/USD 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.005)
∆IT 2.729∗∗∗ 2.729∗∗∗ 2.804∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.471) (0.471) (0.639) (0.033)
∆US −1.991∗∗∗ −1.991∗∗∗ −1.958∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.129) (0.197) (0.009)
Observations 54,606 54,606 54,606 54,606
Wald Test - - 1.2 -
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
We find no statistical significance on the coefficients associated with credit rating, SMP and
the “whatever it takes” speech. This is a particularly surprising as the latter is often cited as one
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of the main factors for the decrease of tensions in the euro bond market as a whole. One may
argue that, while the speech did in fact substantially reduce yields in the periphery, it also led
to an increase in yields of countries like the Netherlands or Finland, as the purchases by core
countries’ investors of periphery debt is likely to increase yields on core countries. Therefore,
this result is likely reflecting a re-balancing of portfolios in terms of sovereign debt, where the
average Euro area yield had already been decreasing by the time the speech took place.
Finally, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant (having
experienced financial stress in previous periods increases the likelihood of stress in the current
period by 20.9 percentage points), which implies the presence of “true state dependence”.9
5.3 Evidence of Financial Contagion: 2002-2020











Lagged Stress 165 3.428 0.207 0.087 100%
Dt
Greek De f icit Reveal 165 0.217 0.013 0.247 0%
A+ to BBB− 165 −0.105 −0.006 0.255 0%
LT ROS 165 −0.263 −0.016 0.129 72%
Mar 12th 165 3.153 0.191 0.364 100%
PEPP 165 −4.238 −0.257 0.504 100%
Pt
V IX 165 0.008 0.0005 0.005 0%
EUR/USD 165 −0.295 −0.178 0.317 0%
∆IT 165 3.702 0.224 2.113 0%
∆US 165 −1.450 −0.088 0.637 100%
Stresst−1
Austria 45 −0.152 −0.009 0.130 0%
Belgium 45 0.217 0.013 0.115 44%
Finland 45 0.150 0.091 0.109 9%
France 45 0.024 0.001 0.107 0%
Greece 45 0.388 0.023 0.106 100%
Ireland 45 0.168 0.010 0.113 18%
Italy 45 0.287 0.017 0.114 87%
Netherlands 45 0.170 0.010 0.108 11%
Slovakia 45 0.070 0.004 0.099 0%
Slovenia 45 0.085 0.005 0.107 0%
Spain 45 0.055 0.003 0.111 0%
Table 5.3 displays the estimates for the model aimed at identifying financial contagion,
9Before proceeding with the estimation of contagion coefficients in a time series framework, all variables that
hold no statistical power in the baseline regression are removed to move on to a more country-specific analysis.
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specifically for the case of Portugal during the entire sample period. Column 1, 2 and 3 report
the average coefficient, marginal effect and standard errors of each variable as weighted by
the integrated-likelihood of each one of the models, respectively. Most importantly, column 5
presents the fraction of times each variable was statistically significant at a 5% level in explaining
Portuguese stress. In his paper, Sala-i-Martin settles the statistical significance of a variable
when the fraction of times it was significant at 5% is over 95%. Without any loss of information,
a more comprehensive classification is considered in this paper, as a variable that is significant
80% of the times is likely to have sufficient statistical power for inference to be made.
A first important finding relates to the fact that variable VIX, representative of global risk
factors, now loses its statistical significance once the model accounts for other countries’ stress.
Table 5.4: Significance of Country Stress Indicators & VIX in explaining a Country’s Stress
Influencee






AUS - 0% 0% 69% 0% 0% 7% 64% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
BEL 100% - 0% 100% 29% 73% 100% 87% 42% 11% 84% 100% 100%
FIN 7% 24% - 7% 0% 7% 0% 27% 7% 16% 0% 0% 100%
FRA 44% 0% 0% - 0% 0% 16% 0% 0% 84% 0% 62% 69%
GRE 0% 100% 0% 0% - 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 13% 11% 100%
IRE 38% 73% 0% 51% 31% - 40% 78% 40% 0% 40% 27% 100%
ITA 10% 100% 4% 100% 89% 100% - 87% 91% 100% 100% 100% 69%
NEL 53% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% - 2% 84% 0% 0% 98%
POR 27% 57% 0% 16% 100% 80% 7% 0% - 9% 42% 51% 100%
SLK 69% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 100% 0% 100%
SLV 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% - 0% 100%
SPA 98% 76% 0% 60% 0% 62% 80% 98% 0% 7% 0% - 100%
VIX 26% 0% 15% 0% 61% 72% 0% 0% 27% 100% 100% 0% -
For a more general view, Table 5.4 reports, in matrix form, the percentage of times each
country and VIX were statistically significant at 5% in explaining each country’s periods of
stress. The rows correspond to the "contagious" country and the columns to the country whose
stress is being influenced. The loss of significance of VIX seems to be widespread across
several countries apart from Slovakia and Slovenia (last row on Table 5.4).10 This points towards
evidence that contagious links are likely being captured by global risk factors when not directly
10Results for the model including Slovakia and Slovenia must be interpreted with caution, as their stress variables
could be highly influenced by exchange rate volatility prior to their entry in the Euro, as previously stated.
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accounted for, suggesting that the significance found in a panel data setting occurred merely due
to biased estimates as a result of omitted variables. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Caceres et
al. (2010), failing to separate global from country-specific shocks will lead to misspecification
errors, as when a common shock forces two countries to move in tandem (Forbes and Rigobon,
2002). This is often the case with changes in interest rates or oil prices, for example. In order to
ensure that this study is robust to such errors, we proceed to a careful examination of the role of
VIX in country regressions in order to assess the dimension of the problem.
Table 5.5: Determinants of Portuguese Stress with and without VIX & Country Stress Indicators
Including Everything Excluding VIX Excluding Stress
Avg. Coef. Avg. M.E. Avg. Coef. Avg. M.E. Avg. Coef. Avg. M.E.
Stress Stress Stress Stress z-stat Stress Stress z-stat
Austria −0.152 −0.009 −0.112 −0.007 −0.226 - - -
Belgium 0.217 0.013 0.299 0.012 0.114 - - -
Finland 0.150 0.091 0.166 0.010 −0.108 - - -
France 0.024 0.001 0.038 0.002 −0.094 - - -
Greece 0.388 0.023 0.408 0.025 −0.136 - - -
Ireland 0.168 0.010 0.198 0.012 −0.198 - - -
Italy 0.287 0.017 0.274 0.017 0.081 - - -
Netherlands 0.170 0.010 0.240 0.013 −0.222 - - -
Portugal - - - - - - - -
Slovakia 0.070 0.004 0.082 0.005 −0.086 - - -
Slovenia 0.085 0.005 0.165 0.010 −0.555 - - -
Spain 0.055 0.003 0.081 0.005 −0.162 - - -
V IX 0.008 0.0005 - - - 0.011 0.0007 −0.454
Lagged Stress 3.428 0.207 3.430 0.210 −0.018 3.510 0.215 -
Greek De f icit Reveal 0.217 0.013 0.185 0.011 0.094 0.191 0.011 -
A+ to BBB− −0.105 −0.006 −0.098 −0.011 −0.021 −0.041 −0.003 -
LT ROS −0.263 −0.016 −0.260 −0.016 −0.021 −0.279 −0.017 -
Mar 12th 3.153 0.191 3.610 0.221 −1.101 3.275 0.201 -
PEPP −4.238 −0.257 −4.273 −0.246 0.308 −4.339 −0.266 -
EUR/USD −0.295 −0.178 −0.156 −0.010 −0.313 −0.170 −0.010 -
∆IT 3.702 0.224 3.533 0.216 0.058 3.646 0.223 -
∆US −1.450 −0.088 −1.608 −0.098 0.175 −1.446 −0.089 -
R2 0.228 - - - - - - -
Ad j. R2 0.226 - - - - - - -
[1]Avg. Coef. and Avg. M.E. refer to the Average Coefficient and Average Marginal Effect.
[2]Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the average coefficients and marginal effects of a model including both VIX and
countries’ stress indicators, columns 3 and 4 exclude VIX while columns 6 and 7 exclude the countries’ stress indicators.
[3]z-stat on columns 5 and 8 refer to the result of a z-test for the equality of coefficients, where the alternative hypothesis is
that coefficients are statistically different. Column 5 tests whether stress coefficients differ once variable VIX is removed,
whereas column 8 tests whether the coefficient on VIX differs once stress indicators are removed.
Several things are worth stressing. First, as per the last column on Table 5.4, the stress of other
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countries seems to be a statistically significant determinant of VIX. However, the R2 obtained
from regressing VIX on all country stress indicators simultaneously is only about 23%, hinting
that there is more in VIX than Euro-denominated stress. This attests that results are not merely
due to global shocks that increase co-movements between countries because of interdependence
alone. Table 5.5 analyses the relevance of differences between models including VIX and country
stress indicators in alternate when estimating the determinants of Portuguese stress. Columns 1
and 2 report the average coefficients and marginal effects of a model including both VIX and
countries’ stress indicators (the same as reported on Table 5.3), columns 3 and 4 exclude variable
VIX, while columns 6 and 7 exclude the stress indicators. By testing the differences between
these three models, we are able to assess the volatility of variable VIX. Z-tests are conducted
to test for the equality of coefficients (columns 5 and 8). It follows that the inclusion of VIX
does not seem to greatly disturb the stress coefficients, nor is the coefficient on VIX seemingly
affected by the inclusion of stress variables, given that results on z-tests are insignificant.
This analysis suggests that contagion tends to be statistically manifested by global risk factors
when not directly accounted for. That being true, VIX’s influence under a panel data specification
is spurious due to omitted variable bias, which is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel result.
5.4 Evidence of Financial Contagion: Subperiods
Moving forward to the analysis of the presence of contagion itself, it would seem that, perhaps
more relevant than analysing the full period from 2002 to 2020, would be to analyse specific
subperiods. A total of 5 relevant events were considered. The selection of these events was made
by plotting the average number of countries under stress per month and searching for structural
breaks separating roughly homogeneous periods, as highlighted in Figure 5.211: (i) the onset of
the subprime mortgage crisis (Jun 2007); (ii) Greece’s first downgrade (by Fitch) following the
reveal of a 12.5% deficit, on 8 Dec 2009; (iii) Mario Draghi’s "whatever it takes" speech on 26
11Unfortunately, this is not entirely possible, as the computation of a regression of this size requires that all
countries have stress episodes in every period to be able to play a role in each other’s stress. For this reason, some
periods have to be larger and not unconditionally similar in terms of the number of countries under financial stress.
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Jul 201212, (iv) when it became apparent that Greece is set to default on its debt repayment loans
to the IMF and will likely need another bailout (May 2015); and (v) the COVID-19 pandemic.
Figure 5.2: Fraction of Countries experiencing Financial Stress per month
Some limitations should be accounted for when using a probit model, namely, the failure to
analyse periods with few stress episodes. This does not allow for the comparison between tranquil
and crisis periods (as in Forbes and Rigobon, 2002 to better distinguish between contagion and
interdependence). However, even if one can never claim results constitute unambiguous proof of
contagion, analysing solely extreme occurrences of sovereign yields as well as controlling for
push factors as proxies for global shocks does offer some reassurance, since results will reflect a
financial linkage between countries beyond what ordinary conditions can explain.
On the basis of this limitation, the time span between the "whatever it takes" speech and
Greece’s 3rd bailout, as well as the COVID-19 crisis are not susceptible of analysis. Furthermore,
a valid assessment of contagious links can only consider Slovakia and Slovenia’s financial stress
from 2008 onward, as previously mentioned. As such, Table 5.6 presents the fraction of times
other countries were statistically significant in explaining a given country’s stress, where Panel A
presents the results for the period between Greece’s Fitch downgrade and the "whatever it takes"
12While this may seem a contradictory result when compared to the statistical insignificance obtained under
a panel specification, by July 2012 only about 2 countries were experiencing financial stress. While the speech
effectively marks the end of the sovereign crisis, its impact wasn’t as vital in perspective.
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speech, and Panel B the period between Greece’s 3rd bailout and 31 Dec 2019.
Table 5.6: Significance of other Countries’ Stress Indicators in explaining a Country’s Stress
Panel A: From Greece’s first downgrade following the reveal of a 12.5% deficit (8 Dec 2009) to Mario
Draghi’s "whatever it takes" speech (26 Jul 2012)13
Influencee






AUS - 100% 0% 56% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0%
BEL 0% - 0% 91% 16% 2% 0% 36% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FIN 0% 78% - 0% 0% 31% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FRA 0% 69% 0% - 100% 0% 0% 0% 35% 0% 0% 31%
GRE 0% 0% 0% 31% - 0% 0% 0% 83% 2% 0% 0%
IRE 0% 13% 0% 56% 20% - 0% 0% 100% 53% 0% 0%
ITA 39% 24% 0% 91% 0% 100% - 4% 22% 96% 73% 0%
NEL 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% - 0% 0% 0% 0%
POR 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 0% 0% - 67% 0% 7%
SLK 0% 0% 0% 47% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 0% 0%
SLV 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 0%
SPA 57% 40% 0% 62% 7% 0% 100% 73% 9% 22% 0% -
Panel B: From Greece’s 3rd bailout (22 May 2015) to 31 Dec 201914
Influencee






AUS - 31% 0% 7% 0% 7% 0% 65% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BEL 100% - 0% 100% 9% 0% 36% 58% 38% 4% 93% 93%
FIN 0% 93% - 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FRA 0% 11% 0% - 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 4% 0% 51%
GRE 0% 0% 0% 0% - 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 57% 0%
IRE 22% 100% 0% 80% 0% - 31% 89% 100% 0% 0% 29%
ITA 62% 91% 22% 100% 0% 100% - 84% 7% 100% 100% 100%
NEL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 0% 58% 0% 9%
POR 0% 53% 0% 0% 100% 0% 22% 0% - 0% 33% 0%
SLK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 0% 0%
SLV 56% 0% 0% 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 0% - 0%
SPA 24% 2% 2% 9% 0% 0% 100% 16% 0% 0% 0% -
The first, most intuitive result one can derive is that, contrary to popular belief, Greece does not
seem to be as "contagious" as the literature describes it. In fact, it only seems to be a statistically
significant determinant of Portuguese stress in both periods. This result is consistent with works
such as Missio and Watzka (2011) and Conefrey and Cronin (2015), who find that Greece’s
impact on other markets subsided after mid-2010 and early 2012 as other countries saw Greek
public finances as detached from their own. This may as well be due to ECB’s prompt responses
through the implementation of policies like its LTROs or the increase of its purchases through
13Number of episodes of stress during this period: Austria 14 (166 days), Belgium 17 (178 days), Finland 11
(133 days), France 15 (169), Greece 11 (260 days), Ireland 11 (256 days), Italy 16 (187 days), Netherlands 13 (123
days), Portugal 10 (230 days), Slovakia 13 (204 days), Slovenia 20 (313 days), Spain 14 (249 days).
14Number of episodes of stress during this period: Austria 9 (175 days), Belgium 13 (231 days), Finland 15 (219
days), France 17 (217 days), Greece 21 (107 days), Ireland 17 (215 days), Italy 17 (241 days), Netherlands 14 (202
days), Portugal 15 (166 days), Slovakia 12 (246 days), Slovenia 15 (203 days), Spain 18 (136 days).
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the quantitative easing program, assuaging the general economic sentiment.
Perhaps our most important finding is the fact that causalities here implied are often not
exclusive nor mutual, making it hard to group the countries with mutual relevance, especially
during the sovereign debt crisis. While it seems that Belgium and France play a role in each
other’s stress, the same cannot be said for Austria, whose stress influences Belgium but the
reverse is not true. Finland, for instance, seems to be somewhat detached from the euro-bond
market sentiment, even if it plays a role in Belgian stress. Analogously, Irish and Greek stresses
are not influenced by Portugal while the reverse holds. This debunks, to some extent, the common
belief of a dichotomy between core and periphery countries.
This concept seems even more ambivalent and harder to apply following Greece’s 3rd bailout,
as some countries’ stress seems to be transversal to the idea of groups. Italy more than doubles
the number of countries it influences from one crisis period to another. Its discernible political
crises in this period (mostly due to a hung parliament, which resulted in a long period of political
instability), were able to affect the economic sentiment of several other Eurozone members, such
as Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. This is a result that
seems to offer some statistical strength to the hypothesis of "wake-up call" contagion, where
financial markets report increased sensitivity between them, after an event forces them to reassess
their views on other countries. This is corroborated to some extent by the seeming consistency
of the vast majority of other contagious links when moving from one period to another.
6 Conclusion
Overall, this paper offers strong evidence on the presence of contagion within the sovereign
bond market during periods of financial distress for certain Eurozone countries.
Main results can be summarized as follows. Using a dynamic panel, we find evidence on the
sensitivity of periods of financial stress to the common culprits studied in the literature, such
as global risk aversion, market iliquidity and currency volatility. Additionally, stress is found
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to decrease in response to key ECB responses to crisis periods, such as the implementation
of the LTROs or PEPP. A negative, statistically significant coefficient on U.S.’ yield seems to
provide evidence of flight-to-safety to the U.S. in times of distress. Contrary to popular belief, the
well-known “whatever it takes” speech by Mario Draghi is not statistically significant, nor is the
implementation of the SMP, when the stress of the Euro area as a whole is estimated. Evidence
is additionally found on state dependence of financial stress, highlighting its persistence.
Under a time series setting for a country-specific analysis, we use the methodology proposed
by Sala-i-Martin (1997) to account for other countries’ stress indicators. The coefficients
associated with variable VIX are no longer statistically significant, which seems to suggests
that its influence under a panel data specification was likely due to an omitted variable bias. By
controlling for push factors and restricting the analysis to abnormally high yield occurrences,
there is some confidence that outcomes are able to reflect financial contagion as opposed to sole
interdependence between countries. Results seemingly dispute the usual association of core and
periphery countries, well-documented across the literature, as causalities found are nor exclusive
nor mutual. Surprisingly, Greece’s influence is not as extensive as previously thought. Italy’s,
however, is widespread over multiple countries, especially in the aftermath of the sovereign debt
crisis, which seems to denote the presence of "wake-up call" contagion regarding this country’s
periods of tension.
As a final remark, while one must recognize the merits of a probit model for pinpointing
extreme events, this is also a method that comes with limitations, namely that short-length crises
cannot be analysed. Extending and improving this methodology for an application to more
periods and more countries may be a good option for further research. As more data becomes
available, for instance on the COVID-19 crisis, it would perhaps be interesting to evaluate the
importance of financial contagion for different groups and compare the impact of different crises.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Yields and Stress Variables
Panel A: Correlations of Yields
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SLK SLV SPA
AUS 1.000
BEL 0.998 1.000
FIN 0.067 0.078 1.000
FRA 0.997 0.989 0.064 1.000
GRE −0.022 0.108−0.017−0.002 1.000
IRE 0.715 0.801 0.066 0.718 0.536 1.000
ITA 0.819 0.883 0.073 0.832 0.425 0.872 1.000
NEL 0.996 0.976 0.067 0.995−0.082 0.676 0.787 1.000
POR 0.421 0.542 0.027 0.443 0.841 0.847 0.777 0.371 1.000
SLK 0.978 0.979 0.002 0.977 0.122 0.763 0.842 0.966 0.510 1.000
SLV 0.819 0.863 0.053 0.842 0.545 0.800 0.915 0.803 0.790 0.859 1.000
SPA 0.803 0.867 0.047 0.820 0.477 0.901 0.955 0.777 0.815 0.823 0.947 1.000
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Financial Stress
No. Days No.
Periods
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Stress: Austria 860 57 0.1789 0.3833 0 1
Stress: Belgium 938 56 0.1952 0.3964 0 1
Stress: Finland 832 51 0.1731 0.3784 0 1
Stress: France 978 71 0.2035 0.4026 0 1
Stress: Greece 945 80 0.1966 0.3975 0 1
Stress: Ireland 901 60 0.1875 0.3903 0 1
Stress: Italy 830 55 0.1727 0.3780 0 1
Stress: Netherlands 848 55 0.1764 0.3812 0 1
Stress: Portugal 939 69 0.1954 0.3965 0 1
Stress: Slovakia 1,126 137 0.2343 0.4236 0 1
Stress: Slovenia 924 88 0.1923 0.3941 0 1
Stress: Spain 880 61 0.1831 0.3868 0 1
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(a) Overview of Stress periods in Austria (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Austria
Figure A.1: Financial Stress in Austria 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in Belgium (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Belgium
Figure A.2: Financial Stress in Belgium 2002-2020
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(a) Overview of Stress periods in Finland (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Finland
Figure A.3: Financial Stress in Finland 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in France (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in France
Figure A.4: Financial Stress in France 2002-2020
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(a) Overview of Stress periods in Greece (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Greece
Figure A.5: Financial Stress in Greece 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in Ireland (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Ireland
Figure A.6: Financial Stress in Ireland 2002-2020
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(a) Overview of Stress periods in Italy (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Italy
Figure A.7: Financial Stress in Italy 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in the Netherlands (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in the Netherlands
Figure A.8: Financial Stress in the Netherlands 2002-2020
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(a) Overview of Stress periods in Portugal (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Portugal
Figure A.9: Financial Stress in Portugal 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in Slovakia (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Slovakia
Figure A.10: Financial Stress in Slovakia 2002-2020
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(a) Overview of Stress periods in Slovenia (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Slovenia
Figure A.11: Financial Stress in Slovenia 2002-2020
(a) Overview of Stress periods in Spain (b) Proportion of Days of Stress per Month in Spain
Figure A.12: Financial Stress in Spain 2002-2020
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Table A.2: Description of Portuguese Stress Periods15
Episode Date Description
1 10 - 22 Jan 2002 European Commission warns that it is to recommend
the issue of an early warning after it becomes apparent
that both Portugal and Germany would deviate from the
Maastricht deficit threshold of 3% of GDP.
2 12 Feb 2002 Yields rise in expectation of ECOFIN’s decision of
whether to issue an early warning. Eventually, it does not
follow through with it as Portugal and Germany review
their consolidation plans and medium-term targets.
3 10 – 17 Apr 2002 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair proposes a referendum
on whether the country should join the Euro. The idea is
met with resistance, as a number of Labour MPs created
a group called Labour Against the Euro (LATE).
4 14 – 20 Jun 2002 News that France is likely to miss the Stability and
Growth Pact’s demand that the countries’ budgets should
be balanced by 2004 raises questions on the credibility
of the euro. The slow economic growth experienced by
several EMU countries as Portugal, France, Germany
and Italy leads them to present budget deficits similar or
even crossing the 3% threshold.
Discussions on the EU’s most ambitious enlargement
(scheduled to 2004) are stalled on divergences related
to the fight against illegal immigration and the funds to
attribute to eastern countries’ farmers.
ECB’s prediction for EMU inflation is revised upwards,
suggesting that it is likely to raise eurozone interest rates.
15News reports sourced from Financial Times, Reuters and Jornal de Negócios
39
Episode Date Description
5 26 Jun - 08 Jul 2002 Prime Minister Durão Barroso, just elected, officially
reveals in a speech that Portugal holds a deficit of
3.9% of GDP for 2001, officially becoming the first
country in the EMU to be in breach, which exposes it
to the possibility of sanctions if the Excessive Deficit
Procedure (EDP) is launched, should they be unable to
reduce their deficit by the end of 2003. Fines could go
up to 0.5% of GDP and/or the withholding of access to
EU’s cohesion funds.
6 24 Jul – 01 Aug 2002 This figure is revised to 4.1%, prompting the European
Commission to declare its intention to write a report and
set the EDP in motion.
7 05 – 19 Aug 2002 WorldCom accounting scandal and bankruptcy.
8 07 Mar – 07 Apr 2003 Portugal’s involvement in the war with Iraq: U.S.
President George W. Bush, Spanish Prime Minister José
Maria Aznar, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
Prime Minister Durão Barroso meet in Terceira, Azores
to finalize an agreement on the invasion and occupation
of Iraq. Concerns about a potential war with Iraq lead
European yields to rise.
9 17 Jun 2003 Little consensus on the proposed European Constitution,
as the UK vetoes the first draft because it feels it weakens
its ability to resist majority voting in key areas.
10 24 Oct – 10 Dec 2003 Both Germany and France ran budget deficits over the
3% of GDP ceiling, Germany with its biggest budget
deficit since WWII. The credibility of the Euro is once
again questioned as no fines are imposed on either
country. Political turmoil ensues.
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Episode Date Description
11 15 Jan – 12 Feb 2004 The European Commission launched legal action against
national finance ministers over their failure to sanction
Germany and France for breaking the Stability and
Growth Pact. This prompts discussion on whether or
not the best option would be to reform the pact rather
than risking antagonizing two of the Euro’s largest
economies.
12 11 Mar – 02 Apr 2004 Madrid Terrorist Attacks.
13 22 Mar – 25 Mar 2005 José Sócrates takes over as Prime-Minister after
President Jorge Sampaio dissolved the former
government on the grounds of political instability.
Several EU countries start presenting concerning
economic statistics on unemployment levels and slow
growth.
14 29 Mar – 06 Apr 2005 Spreads of several countries against the German Bund
start diverging ahead of the French referendum on the
European Constitution as investors are worried about
the prospect of a rejection. Portugal sets a date to hold
its own referendum but it is delayed with the fall of the
government and for other legislative reasons.
15 14 – 22 Apr 2005 Prime Minister José Sócrates announces a public deficit
of over 6%. This clashes with the former office’s
prediction of a 2% public deficit. Sócrates says the
former prediction of the government of Santana Lopes
lacked credibility.
16 26 - 27 Apr 2005 Yields rise in fear of austerity measures being planned to
tackle the 6.8% deficit.17 29 Apr - 04 May 2005
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Episode Date Description
18 15 Jun 2005 The rejection of the European Constitution at
referendums in both France and the Netherlands
increases yields on periphery countries, while yields
on Dutch and French bonds don’t show any significant
response.
19 07 Jul – 12 Aug 2005 London Metro Bombings.
Standard & Poor’s downgrades Portugal’s rating on 27
Jun 2005. Fitch reduced its outlook to negative.
European Commission offers once again a
recommendation on the excessive deficit situation felt in
Portugal.
According to Financial Times, it appears investors have
reawakened given the deterioration of public finances in
the weakest EMU countries.
20 23 – 24 Feb 2006
21 14-17 Apr 2006
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet raised warnings about
inflation following signs that the European economy is
picking up, putting several Eurozone countries on alert
that the ECB would raise its benchmark interest rate
several times during the year. During this period, the
ECB raised its repo rate four times: in early March, June,
August (coinciding with a raise in interest rates by the
Bank of England as well) and in October.
22 07 Mar 2006
23 24 Mar 2006
24 03 - 04 Apr 2006
25 14-17 Apr 2006
26 20 Apr 2006
27 01 May 2006 Additionally, in early July, General Motors annonced it’s
intention to shut down operations in its van factory in
Azambuja by December, despite pleas by prime minister
José Sócrates. It was the main employer in the region.
28 13 Jul – 22 Aug 2006
29 04 - 11 Oct 2006
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Episode Date Description
30 05 – 14 Sep 2007 The subprime mortgage crisis seemingly spreads
worldwide as several banks in Europe announce they
will no longer rescue real estate funds in need.
The ECB attempts to circumvent this by injecting
liquidity into credit markets to ease the pressure of
countries that may have difficulties obtaining credit,
coordinating with the central banks of the United States,
Australia, Canada and Japan for the first time since 9/11.
Fears of a future recession in the U.S. spark.
31 21 – 31 Jan 2008 Emergency interest rate cuts by the U.S. federal reserve.
Eurozone bond markets respond with extreme volatility
as they wait for an ECB policy response.
32 15 Feb – 31 Mar 2008 Bear Stearns Crisis: collapse of Bear Stearns’ hedge
funds, a U.S. investment bank in the mortgage market.
Yields across the Eurozone only start decreasing after
the bank’s rescue (Mar 16).
33 11 Aug – 13 Oct 2008 The collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers
(Sep 15) and of U.S’s largest insurance company AIG
(Sep 16) creates concerns over the global economy
and health of the financial sector, as many European
hedge funds and insurance groups sold protection to
Lehman Brothers. It is expected that governments will
be forced to recapitalize their banks, leaving countries
like Portugal (with a current account deficit of 11% of
GDP) with more difficulties in funding.
34 23 Oct – 13 Nov 2008 Portugal nationalizes Banco Português dos Negócios,
after it accumulated losses of C700 Million and is at risk
of not being able to meet payments.
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Episode Date Description
35 04 Dec 2008 – 06 Jan
2009
Banco Privado Português receives a capital injection
as a result of liquidity difficulties given the economic
context.
Moody’s gives Portugal a negative outlook.
36 12 Jan – 03 Feb 2009 Standard & Poor’s strips Spain of its AAA rating, Greece
to A- and threatens a downgrade on Portuguese rating
citing the deterioration of their public finances. On Jan
21 the rating is indeed downgraded.
37 12 Feb – 03 Mar 2009 Euro area yields surge in worries over the cost of
bailing out banks and stimulating their economies as
a recession becomes apparent. Credit markets respond
disappointingly to the U.S. financial stability plan and in
expectation of a decision by the Federal Reserve whether
or not to buy U.S. government debt.
38 08 – 28 Dec 2009 Following the burst of a housing bubble in Dubai that
leaves it unable to serve its debt, fears start spreading
that the same might happen to Greece as it declares a
revised public deficit of over 12%, exceeding over 4
times the EU’s threshold (Oct 21).
International financial markets start responding to
Greece’s deficit reveal when Fitch, Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s all downgrade Greek sovereign debt




39 13 Jan - 16 Feb 2010 Portugal announces a budget deficit of 9.3%. Bond
markets in Portugal, Spain and Ireland come under
pressure because of their weak key economic indicators.
After the Greek government announced its plans to
tackle its debt levels, Portugal experiences a mass sell-
off of government bonds for its lack of action. A bond
auction had to be scaled back.
European Commission publicly condemns Greece for
deliberately misreporting and providing false statistics
about its public finances.
Fitch maintains its negative outlook on Portugal’s
sovereign debt, claiming that a downgrade of its rating
is also likely.
40 16 Apr – 07 May 2010 Talks on Greece’s rescue package begin: Greece signals
that it is to make a formal request for financial assistance
once terms are negociated. Germany alternates between
offering conditioned help and threatening expulsion
from the Euro for the members who do not comply with
the Stability and Growth Pact. Portugal’s bond yields
rise on fears that it may have trouble repaying its debt.
Greece’s budget deficit is revised higher, to 13.6%.
Moody’s downgrades Greece’s debt by one notch while
Standard & Poor’s downgrades it to junk status as the
Greek-German spread surpasses 1,000 bp, sparking fears
on Greece’s exit from the Euro.
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Episode Date Description
40 16 Apr – 07 May 2010 On Apr 23, Greece officially requests financial
assistance. On May 2, a C110 billion package is agreed
on, and on May 6 the Greek government approved the
harshest program of fiscal adjustment set of austerity
measures since the end of WWII in order to ensure the
aid package. Protests of thousands ignite on the streets.
Standard & Poor’s downgrades both Spain and Portugal
(Portugal by 2 notches). Ireland skips a bond auction.
41 24 Aug – 13 Oct 2010 Ireland announces the rescue of the Anglo-Irish Bank.
Fitch downgrades Ireland’s sovereign credit rating.
German Chancelor Angela Merkel warns that debt
holders should be forced to take losses as part of debt-
restructuring, further leading investors to avoid buying
bonds from periphery countries.
42 04 – 16 Nov 2010 Portuguese Parliament passes an austerity budget,
cutting public spending and increasing VAT, widely
unpopular measures.
Ireland’s Finance Minister Brian Lenihan said Ireland’s
public deficit would be over 11.9% and that rescuing the
Ango-Irish bank would likely lead the net debt level to
surpass 100% of GDP.
Finance minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos admits
there is a high risk of needing an emergency aid. East




42 04 – 16 Nov 2010 Yields rise in response to the Franco-German proposal
for a rescue mechanism, abandoning the no-bailout
clause of the Maastrict Treaty.
Speculation around Portugal being in line for an aid
package rise, both the ECB and Prime Minister José
Sócrates dismiss the need for Portugal to require
financial aid because its debt and deficit levels are lower
and it has not suffered a property crash like Ireland.
Standard & Poor’s, as well as Moody’s, downgrade
Ireland’s credit rating.
43 23 Mar - 13 May 2011 Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, all downgrade
Portugal’s rating. Standard & Poor’s downgrades it twice
in a single week.
Yields rise in Portugal ahead of an austerity budget vote
to avoid a bailout, a sign of investors’ concerns on the
country’s ability to serve its debt. The plan is rejected
and Prime Minister José Sócrates resigns.
An Eurosceptic Finish party publicly claims it cannot
support any financial assistance provided to Portugal.
LCH.Clearnet, one of the largest interest rate swaps
clearers in the world, issues a statement where
Portuguese bonds would no longer be eligible as
collateral for loans.
Portugal officially requests financial assistance.
Talk abounds on a potential Greek debt restructure.
44 20 May – 20 Jul 2011 Portugal’s request is approved and it is set to receive a
package totaling C78 billion.
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Episode Date Description
44 20 May – 20 Jul 2011 More austerity packages are signed in Greece (Jun 29),
accompanied by violent protests outside the parliament
building and across several other Greek cities. Its rating
keeps getting downgraded. Standard & Poor’s gives it
its lowest status possible on Jun 13. Yields in Portugal
rise further as talk abounds that Greece might be the first
country to leave the Euro, as a second bailout package
is agreed with the Troika (C 120 billion).
Moody’s downgrades both Portugal’s and Ireland’s
rating to junk status.
Signing of the treaty for the European Stability
Mechanism.
45 25 Nov 2011 – 06 Jan
2012
Additional legislation is proposed to strengthen
budgetary monitoring. Common issuance of sovereign
bonds across the Euro area is proposed for the first time,
the so called Eurobonds.
Yields rise in Spain as its yields surpassed Greece’s on
the 3-month bond. Italy’s yield curve inverts.
Six pack enters into force, and the first Long Term
Refinancing Operation (LTROs) takes place.
46 16 Jan – 02 Feb 2012 Yields rise unprecedentedly for Spain, Italy and
Belgium, and for the first time, they rise significantly
for AAA rated countries as well. Standard & Poor’s
downgrades 9 EMU members, citing their inability to
collectively respond to the crisis.
Standard & Poor’s downgrades the European Financial
Stability Facility, as well.
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Episode Date Description
46 16 Jan – 02 Feb 2012 Greece names a list of over 4 100 Greek citizens that owe
over C 14.9 billion in unpaid taxes to the government,
which is more than the C 14.5 billion bond payment
the country has to make until Mar 20 (which it will be
unable to meet). Tensions in the relationship between
the country and its creditors persist over talks of a debt
write-off.
47 06 Apr 2012 A Greek man takes his own life in front of the Greek
parliament as a protest against austerity, and sparks
further protests in Athens.
Yields on Spanish and Italian bonds keep rising as
investors prefer less risky assets such as US or German
government bonds, following a disappointing bond
auction in Spain.
48 31 Dec 2012 – 01 Jan
2013
In a report, the EU Commission states that Portugal’s
bailout program requires strict austerity measures to
re-enter financial markets, as its political setbacks and
weaker-than-expected growth leave it on track to miss
its next bailout review.
49 27 Mar – 12 Apr 2013 Cyprus becomes the first country to limit capital
movements (withdrawls, transfers, credit card
transactions), after fears of a bank run as the ECB
threatened to halt emergency liquidity assistance to the
country’s two largest banks if they fail to agree on a
plan for its bailout.
Corruption scandals in Spain as well as failed elections
in Italy raise the yields on Portuguese debt.
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Episode Date Description
49 27 Mar – 12 Apr
2013
Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice annuls austerity
measures that will have a significant budget impact.
50 02 Jul – 19 Jul
2013
U.S. Federal Reserve announces its intention to cut its
injections of cheap money that investors often used to buy
risk bonds.
Greek Parliament agrees to further austerity measures as a
condition to another tranche of the ongoing EU-IMF bailout,
including tax reforms, wage cuts and other budget cuts. Labor
unions call for general strikes in protest.
Portugal’s finance minister Vítor Gaspar and foreign minister
Paulo Portas both resign. Paulo Portas steps up as deputy
prime minister.
51 08 – 25 Jul 2014 Luxembourg’s justice authorities begin an investigation into
3 holding companies of Banco Espírito Santo.
52 05 – 13 Aug 2014 Portugal rescues Banco Espírito Santo.
53 22 May – 19 Jun
2015
Eurozone’s bond yields rise when it becomes clear that the
Greek government will miss its C 1.6 billion payment to the
IMF when its bailout expires on Jun 30, marking the first
time a developed country defaults to the IMF. Negotiations
between the Greek government and its creditors remain
turbulent after the IMF negotiators walked out of the bailout
talks and Prime Minister Tsipras proposed a referendum on
the EU proposals.
54 02 – 09 Jul 2015 Jun 28: Amid concerns that Greece will not be able to stay in




54 02 – 09 Jul 2015 Jun 30: Greece defaults on its payment to the IMF.
Jul 5: Greek referendum on a bailout agreement, which is
rejected and leads to the resignation of Finance Minister
Yanis Varoufakis. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras goes
forward with an agreement anyway after discussions that
Greece might be forced to leave the euro if any deal fails to
be struck.
55 05 – 17 Nov 2015 Inconclusive government elections in Portugal. Yield surge
as a left-wing political coalition (“Geringonça”) steps into
power, aiming to reverse harsh austerity.
Threat of a credit downgrade by DBRS which would stop
Portugal from accessing the ECB’s Quantitative Easing
Program.
56 07 Jan – 25 Feb
2016
Portuguese yields remain volatile as financial markets worry
over a potentially unstable government.
57 13 – 17 Jun 2016 Yields across the Euro Area rise after approval on U.K.’s
referendum to leave the EU.58 24 – 28 Jun 2016
59 13 Sep – 10 Oct
2016
Threat of a credit rating downgrade by DBRS, following a
missed a budget deficit forecast target.
60 17 – 21 Nov 2016 Investors sell-off Portuguese bonds amid renewed fears of
political fragility because of its high debt level and slow
growth rate, after the European Commission warned that it
was not complying with stipulated deficit limits.
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Episode Date Description
61 16 Dec 2016 – 12 Jan
2017
Fears over potential U.S. protectionist policies in trade
following Donald Trump’s election as President of the
United States.
62 26 Jan - 10 Feb 2017 The IMF maintains that Greece’s debt has reached
unsustainable proportions and that the budget cuts
EU creditors demand will hamper Greece’s economic
growth. Greece disputes "the IMF’s absurd demands".
63 18 May – 01 Jun 2018 Political turbulence in Italy: after an election resulted
in a hung parliament, a populist, Eurosceptic coalition
takes power and the political uncertainty causes mass a
sell-off of Italian bonds.
64 05 – 14 Jun 2018 Spanish parliament votes to replace Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy with Pedro Sánchez in a vote of no-
confidence after a corruption scandal in the centre-right
party.
65 20 – 31 Aug 2018 Fear of contagion from the Turkish Currency Crisis
(President Erdogan decides to concentrate decision-
making power), due to exposure to Turkish banks,
weighs heavily on periphery countries, especially due to
the high demand for German Bunds for its safe-haven
status.
Italy’s new government begins budget discussions.
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Episode Date Description
66 18 – 26 Oct 2018 Italian politicians argue that it is unfair for the EU
Commission to single out Italy when all periphery
nations have concerning budgetary positions.
Moody’s downgrades Italy’s rating by one notch while
Standard & Poor’s leave it but change its outlook to
negative.
67 09 – 23 Nov 2018 The EU Commission issues a warning that Italy’s deficit
has breached the threshold of 3% of GDP, according to
Commission calculations and against what the Italian
government stated.
Italian government goes against EU Commission
indications with a budget that aims to sharply increase
public spending. Investors start fearing the “diabolic
loop” once again, as Italy’s debt is much higher than
Greece’s was before the beginning of the crisis.
68 31 Dec 2019 Mass sell-off of Eurozone sovereign bonds causes yields
to increase as a result of an outbreak of optimism in
market sentiment.
69 25 Feb – 25 Mar 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and economic lockdown.
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Aaa AAA AAA 21
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 20
Aa2 AA AA 19
Aa3 AA- AA- 18
A1 A+ A+ 17
A2 A A 16
A3 A- A- 15
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 14
Baa2 BBB BBB 13
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 12
Speculative Grade
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 11
Ba2 BB BB 10
Ba3 BB- BB- 9
B1 B+ B+ 8
B2 B B 7
B3 B- B- 6
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 5
Caa2 CCC CCC 4
Caa3 CCC- CCC- 3














Credit Rating -0.824 I(1) Lagged Downgrade -68.043*** I(0)
VIX -7.920*** I(0) - - -
EUR/USD Exchange Rate -2.682*** I(0) - - -
Interbank Tensions -1.904* I(1) ∆ IT -71.606*** I(0)
U.S. Yield -1.545 I(1) ∆ U.S. Yield -73.672*** I(0)
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